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Summary
Since trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly called “fast-track negotiating
authority” expired in 1994, Congress has been unable to agree on language for its
reauthorization. U der TPA, Congress agrees to consider t ade agreements which the
President has negotiated, on a fast-track basis – without amendment and with limited
debate.  TPA  facilitates the adoption of trade agreements in that  it arguably reassures
negotiating partners that heir carefully crafted concessions will not be changed when
Congress votes on the implementing legislation for the agreement.  
   
A key issue in current efforts to reauthorize TPA is the extent to which Congress
will allow labor and environment provisions in new trade agreements considered
under fast-track procedures.  This report  traces the congressional TPA-labor debate
since 1994 when the previous fast-track authority expired, and compares H.R. 3005
(Thomas), the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, reported by the
House Ways and Means Committee on October 16, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-249) and H.R.
3019 (Rangel/Levin), the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001.
H.R. 3005 was passed by the House on December 6, along party lines, by a vote of
215-214, and by the Senate Finance Committee by a vote of 18-3 on December 12.
This report will be updated as events  warrant.  
Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 include as  ov r ll negotiating objectives  of
trade agreements, provisions to promote worker ights.  However, H.R. 3005 aims
to “promote respect for” worker rights "consistent with the International Labor
Organization (ILO)", and H.R. 3019 aims to promote “enforcement of” core labor
standards  “by U.S. trading partners.” 
In terms of principal negotiating objectives, H.R. 3005 would aim to “strengthen
the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards”
through provisions imilar to those in previous trade agreements and fast-track
authority.  H.R. 3019 would aim to “achieve a framework that leads to the adoption
and enforcement of  worker rights” in two different ways: For multilateral trade
agreements, negotiated through the World Trade Organization (WTO), it would
promote them through the WTO and the International Labor Organization (ILO).  For
a bilateral trade agreement, or a trade greement covering a Free Trade Area of the
Americas, H.R. 3019 would aim to promote worker ights enforcement i  part by (1)
including enforceable rules for the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards;
(2) providing for phased-in compliance with labor market standards for least-
developed countries; and (3) including dispute settlement provisions which would
provide in "all contexts for the use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to
promote prompt and full compliance with" decisions by the dispute settlement panel.
Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 call for reviews of the potential impact of  new
trade agreements on U.S. workers.   H.R. 3005 would also call for consultations and
reports to Congress and its committees on various labor ights issues connected with
trade agreements.  A side-by-side comparison of labor provisions f the two bills is
included.
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Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track)
Labor Issues: 
(Including H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019)
Since trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly called “fast-track negotiating
authority” expired in 1994,1 Congress has been unable to agree on language for its
reauthorization. U der TPA, Congress agrees to consider t ade agreements which the
President has negotiated, on a fast-track basis – voting them up or down without
amendment and with limited debate.  TPA or fast-track authority facilitates the
adoption of trade agreements in that  it arguably reassures negotiating partners that
their carefully crafted concessions will not be changed when Congress votes the
implementing legislation for the agreement up or down.  
A key issue in TPA reauthorization has been whether or not, and more recently
the extent o which Congress will allow provisions relating to labor and the
environment in trade agreements destined for fast-track consideration.  
This report focuses on TPA labor issues.2   After summarizing some key
questions for Congress, it traces the congressional debate on the worker ights issue
since 1994 when the previous fast-track authority expired.  Then it compares
provisions in two current bills to extend that authority, in terms of how the worker
rights issue would be treated by each.  These bills are: H.R. 3005 (Thomas), the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, reported by the House Ways and
Means Committee on October 16, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-249) and  H.R. 3019
(Rangel/Levin), the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001.  H.R.
3005 was approved as amended under Rules Committee Resolution H.R. 306 (H.
Rept. 107-323) and passed by the House on December 6, 2001 along party lines, by
a vote of 215-214.  S. 3005 was reported out of the Senate Finance Committee by a
vote of 18-3 on December 12.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Key Questions for Congress
Within the labor-TPA issue in fast-track reauthorization, two key questions seem
to be getting the most attention as Congress focuses in on the reported H.R. 3005 and
compares its provisions with those of the expired TPA:
1. What should be the goal of trade agreements in promoting labor provisions
(worker rights provisions, defined in table 1)?
a. Should they be subject o the same enforcement procedures as other
provisions? (If the answer is “yes,” they would typically be included in the
body of the agreement rather than in a side agreement);
b. How (with what provisions) should labor/worker rights be promoted?
2. Should the TPA authority promote a working party in the WTO to discuss the
link between worker rights and trade?
A comparison of how the expired TPA authority and H.R. 3005 address these
questions follows, together with some responses to these differences.  A lengthy
discussion of provisions in H.R. 3005, and a table comparing the provisions of H.R.
3005 and H.R. 3019 are included toward the back of this report.
Table 1.  Worker Rights Defined
       While there is no single official list of worker rights agreed upon by
interested parties all over the world, there are two similar lists that are most
commonly used.  One is “internationally recognized worker rights” which is
defined in U.S. trade law.  The other is “core labor standards,” which is a
slightly different list identified by the International Labor Organization (ILO), a
United Nations organization founded more than 80 years ago to promote and
protect the rights of workers around the world.  
 Key elements of both worker rights lists are: (a) the right of association ;
(b) the right to organize (into unions) and bargain collectively; (c) prohibition of
forced labor; and (d) minimum age for the employment of children (i.e.,
prohibition of child labor).  The two lists differ in their 5th item.  The U.S. list
includes as (e) acceptable working conditions regarding minimum wages,
maximum hours, and occupational safety and health protection.  The ILO list
includes as (e) freedom from all types of employment discrimination (i.e., on the
basis of sex, race, age, religious preference, etc.)
The worker ights goal of trade agreements under the old TPA was to promote
respect for worker rights without specifying details about how (through what
provisions) worker rights should be promoted, or whetherworker rights provisions
should be subject to the same enforcement (dispute resolution procedures) as other
provisions.
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3 Technically, the principal negotiating objective in P.L. 100-418, Sec. 1101, was “to
secure a review of the relationship of worker ights to GATT articles, objectives, and related
instruments with s view to ensuring that he benefits of the trading system are available to all
workers.”  The GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO), through the
Uruguay Round of Agreements in 1994.  The Act that implemented the Uruguay Round of
Agreements (P.L. 103-465, Sec. 131) requires the President to seek a working party in the
“new WTO” to examine the relationship between i ternationally recognized worker ights and
trade.
H.R. 3005 includes specifics in each of these areas.  Under H.R. 3005, one
principal negotiating objective is promotion of worker rights through self-
enforcement: “ o ensure that parties do not fail to enforce their own labor laws.” 
However H.R. 3005 also includes caveats to this requirement which would also be
objectives for inclusion in a trade agreement.  The caveats would be for parties to
retain discretion i  the reallocation of resources in enforcement, and for protection of
U.S. exports from labor policies that discriminate against them.
Under H.R. 3005, one principal negotiating objective for enforcement is o seek
provisions that treat U.S. primary negotiating objectives “equally” with other
negotiating objectives.
The seeking of a working party on the relationship between worker rights and
trade within the World Trade Organization (WTO) was listed as a principal
negotiating objective of the expired fast-track authority.3  H.R. 3005 does not include
this provision. 
Reaction to How H.R. 3005 Addresses the Key Questions
Between the time that he old fast-track authority expired in 1994 and the time
H.R. 3005 was reported, Congress voted to implement three trade agreements: the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (implemented in 1994 by P.L.
103-82), the Uruguay Round of Ageements, and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement (P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001).  Relating to the key congressional
questions identified above, the provisions included in these agreements are viewed as
precedents by some in Congress and as unique occurrences by others.
NAFTA promotes worker ights by providing that each country abide by its own
labor laws, and that each country strive toward 12 labor standards.  The U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement provides that each country enforce its own laws and strive to
ensure that ILO labor principles and internationally recognized worker ights (see
table 1 above for definition) are “recognized and protected by domestic law.”
Some Democrats in Congress, particularly Representatives Charles B. Rangel,
Ranking Democrat on the House Ways and Means committee, Representative Sander
M. Levin, and Representative Robert T. Matsui, members of the committee and all
co-sponsors of H.R. 3019, have argued that the provisions in the U.S.-Jordan FTA
should be a “floor,” or lower limit for the kind of labor provisions that should be
included in new trade agreements.  They also argue that this floor is not being
honored by H.R. 3005, which specifies as a goal, that parties to a trade agreement
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4 See “Text: Democratic Letter on Fast-Track” included in Inside U.S. Trade, September
28, 2001, and Statement of The Honorable Sander Levin, Ranking Member, Ways and Means
Trade Subcommittee, Statement on Fast-Track/Trade Promotion Authority Legislation, Ways
and Means committee Mark-Up on October 9, 2001:
[www.house.gov/levin/fast_track.html].
5 Ibid.  See also, “Gephardt Sees WTO Declaration Hurting Fast-Track Chances, Inside
U.S. Trade, November 23, 2001.
6 “Republican Letter Against Thomas Bill.”  Inside U.S. Trade, November 23, 2001.
7 “House Negotiations on TPA Compromise To Resume Among Members Next Month”.
Inside U.S. Trade, August 23, 2001.
should “not fail to enforce” their own lab r laws.  Rather than requiring parties to a
trade agreement slated for fast-track consideration by Congress to strive toward
adopting either ILO “core labor” standards or “internationally recognized worker
rights,” these Democrats argue, H.R. 3005 merely includes the more vague goal “to
strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor
standards.4 ” 
The Democrats have also expressed concern that H.R. 3005, unlike the expired
TPA,  does not include the goal of establishing a working party for worker rights and
trade in the WTO.5  This is a goal that has so far been difficult to achieve, because
developing countries are typically strongly opposed to the idea, lest a discussion of
the relationship between worker ights and trade ultimately ead to the imposition of
labor requirements on these countries.   
Some Republicans, on the other hand, (Senators Phil Gramm, Jon Kyl, and Mitch
McConnell) have expressed concern with H.R. 3005 for not including protections on
the sovereignty of U.S. laws.  They argue that if worker rights provisions in a trade
agreement are subject to the same dispute resolution procedures a  other provisions
in the agreement, the United States could be in a position to be judged on whether it
does or does not fail to enforce its own labor standards.  If the U.S. is found to “fail
to enforce” its own labor standards, U.S. goods and services could be subject to
sanctions.  They recommend two amendments to remedy the potential situation.6
Organizations that have come out against TPA legislation (especially H.R. 3005)
include the AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, the United Steelworkers of America, the
Teamsters, and the Communications Workers of America.  Groups in favor of the bill
include the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufactures.7 
Background
Over the past several decades, Congress has passed various pieces of trade
legislation that have included provisions for promoting worker ights.  Between 1969
and 2001, at least six U.S. trade laws (establishing U.S. conditions for preferential
trade  treatment, providing negotiating authority, and providing for trade remedies,)
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8 The trade agreements are: the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),  the
1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, implemented by P.L. 103-82), the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (implemented by P.L. 103-465), and the 2001 U.S.-
Jordan Free Trade Act (implemented by P.L. 107-43).   The trade acts are: The Trade Act of
1974 (P.L. 93-618 as amended by Sec. 503 of P.L. 98-573), amendments to the Generalized
System of Preferences (Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended – P.L. 98-573), the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (P.L. 100-418), a 1990 Amendment to the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (P.L. 101-382),  the 1992 Jobs Through Exports Act (P.L. 102-
549), 1995 amendments to International Financial Institutions Act [Sec. 526(e) of P.L. 103-
306], and the 2000 African Growth and Opportunity Act, (Title I of the Trade and
Development Act of 2000, P.L. 106-200.  For a listof provisions of most of these laws, see
Worker Rights Provisions and Trade Policy: Should They Be Linked? by Mary Jane Bolle,
(CRS Report 96-661 E.)
9 The OTCA also included two additional worker ights mandates for the President.  He was,
to: (a) secure a review of the relationship between worker ights and GATT articles; and (b)
promote as a GATT principle that the denial of worker rights should not be a means for a
country or its industries to gain acompetitive advantage in international trade. (The GATT
was the predecessor body to the WTO.)
and four international trade agreements to which the United States was a mutual party
promoted the rights of workers in countries with which the United States trades.8  
One of those trade acts was the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (OTCA, P.L. 100-418) – the previous fast-track authority which expired in
1994.  This law gave the president broad authority to include worker rights
protections in trade agreements by identifying as a principal negotiating objective of
trade agreements “to promote respect for worker rights.”9 
Before it expired in 1994, OTCA authority was used to negotiate two key
multilateral trade agreements:  the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,
implemented by P.L. 103-182), which for the first time, included a labor side
agreement; and the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Agreements (implemented by P.L.
103-465), which required the President to seek a working party in the new WTO, to
examine the relationship between “internationally recognized worker rights” and
trade.
The debate over the inclusion of worker rights provisions in new fast-track
authority reflects ome shifts in congressional attitude toward including worker ights
provisions in trade agreements – hifts affected in part by experience under NAFTA
and the WTO.
North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect
January 1, 1994, ushered in a new level of controversy over presidential uthority to
include worker rights provisions in trade agreements.
The NAFTA was accompanied by a labor side agreement, the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).  NAALC was  negotiated by the
incoming Clinton Administration, after the NAFTA agreement itself had been
CRS-6
10 These labor principles included the first four of the five  “internationally recognized worker
rights”as  (see page 9 for definition), plus (1) the right to strike; (2) minimum employment
standards relating to overtime pay; (3) elimination of employment discrimination; (4) equal
pay for men and women; (5) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; (6)
protection of migrant workers; (7) minimum employment standards pertaining to minimum
wages; and (8) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses.
11  By 2001, seven years after NAFTA went into effect, total  job “gains” and job “losses”
from NAFTA were still relatively small.  Between  January 1, 1994 and 2001,  jobs created
by increased exports to Mexico and Canada are estimated using the U.S. Trade
Representative’s methodology for the number of jobs supported by each billion dollars worth
of exports,  at roughly 1.3 million, while total direct job “losses” from  increased imports from
or plant relocations to Mexico or Canada re estimated by the Department of Labor at roughly
361,000.
completed, and had several key provisions.  First, under it,  Mexico, Canada, and the
United States all agreed to enforce their own labor standards and to move toward
strengthening those standards relating to 12 agreed-upon labor principles.10  
Second, fines were authorized if a country was taken to dispute settlement and
found to have failed to enforce one of  three of its 12 labor principles – those relating
to (a) prohibition of child labor;( b) payment of minimum wages; or (c) protections
against occupational injuries and illnesses – in a trade-related context.  
Third, sanctions were authorized if a country failed to pay its fines.  Sanctions
are suspension f NAFTA benefits to the amount of the monetary penalty (which may
be no greater than benefits from tariff reductions) for one year.
In reacting to NAFTA, many U.S. multinational corporations were concerned
that NAFTA’s labor side agreement could usher in a new era of attaching more
stringent worker rights provisions to trade agreements.  Their concern was that this
could lead to increased labor costs, particularly in developing countries, where
multinational corporations had begun to greatly expand production operations, and
possibly to restrictions on trade if the provisions were not enforced.  
Organized workers, on the other hand  –  especially in labor-intensive industries,
feared that NAFTA, with its strong investment provisions, could lead to major
increases in U.S. foreign direct investment to Mexico, with potentially adverse  ffects
on U.S. jobs and wages.11 
Organized workers were also disappointed in NAFTA’s labor side agreement
because it did not authorize fines and sanctions for failure to enforce several other
major protections, including: (d) the right o organize and  bargain collectively; (e) the
right to strike; and (f) prohibition of forced labor.  Over time,  most of the cases
arising under NAALC  have been about Mexico’s failure to enforce its laws
permitting workers to organize and bargain collectively – violations not enforceable
by fines or sanctions under NAFTA’s labor side agreement.  As a result of its
concerns and disappointments since NAFTA went into effect, the AFL-CIO has taken
the position that new trade promotion authority must require enforceable worker
rights in the core of all new trade agreements, and  that monetaryfines based on the
CRS-7
12  Statement by AFL-CIO President John Sweeney on Key Principles for Trade Negotiating
Authority, May 11, 2001. [http://www.aflcio.org/publ/press2001/pr0511.htm]
13 From the Singapore Declaration, signed by representatives of WTO countries present at the
first meeting of Ministers of WTO countries in Singapore, December, 1996, contained in the
WTO Annual Report, 1997.  
NAFTA labor side agreement model are inadequate, and have proven an ineffective
means of enforcement.12 
Worker Rights and the WTO
U.S. efforts to promote worker ights in the WTO has added to the controversy
over including worker ights provisions in new trade agreements.  The efforts of the
Clinton Administration to fulfill the OTCA language encouraging the President to
seek in the WTO a working group to examine the relationship between
“internationally recognized worker ights” and trade did not met with success.  In
fact, his efforts and those of other developed countries met with great resistance by
developing countries. 
Developing countries, which make up a majority in the WTO, have expressed a
fear that even a WTO study group on the relationship between worker ights and
trade can lead to the imposition on developing countries of labor standards.  These
are standards which could raise wage costs and thereby threaten the economic growth
of developing countries, which depend heavily on their abundance of low-cost labor.
As a result of this concern, the 1996 WTO Conference of trade ministers in Singapore
voted to shift the focus of worker rights promotion from the WTO to the
International Labor Organization (ILO).  It did this by designating the ILO as the
“competent body to set and deal with” international labor standards.13  The issue of
worker rights has not been addressed in a WTO ministerial conference since 1996. 
1997-1998 House and Senate-Reported Legislation to Renew
Trade Promotion Authority
The WTO experience may not have directly affected an attitude in Congress
toward renewal of trade promotion authority.  However, the fact that U.S. businesses
have increasingly established business operations in developing countries, especially
during the 1990s,may have had an impact, as has experience under NAFTA.    
Nevertheless, so great was the controversy over the linkage of worker ights
provisions (as well as environmental provisions) to trade agreements in the aftermath
of NAFTA, that by 1997, no legislation to reauthorize TPA had been reported out of
committee in either house of Congress. 
In 1997,  a seeming consensus was reached,when the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance Committees reported  out bills to reauthorize trade promotion
authority, in S. 1269 (S.Rept. 105-102), and H.R. 2621 (H.Rept. 105-341).
CRS-8
14  Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background
and Developments in the 107th Congress, by Lenore Sek.  CRS Issue Brief IB10084.
15  Letters exchanged between the U.S. Ambassador from Jordan, Marwan Muasher, and the
USTR, Robert Zoellick, on July 23, 2001.  
Both House and Senate bills aimed to limit presidential fast-track  authority to
include worker rights provisions in trade agreements slated for fast-track
consideration. 
! Specifically, both House and Senate TPA bills would have allowed the
inclusion of labor provisions in trade agreements negotiated under new “fast-
track” procedures only to prevent foreign governments from “derogating
from” (lowering)  existing labor standards in order to attract investment or
gain a competitive trade advantage.  
! The House bill would also have: (1) permitted labor provisions to ensure that
foreign labor practices do not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably serve as disguised
barriers to trade;” and  (2) permitted changes to a country’s labor laws (– i.e.,
changes to weaken those laws) if the changes were “consistent with sound
macroeconomic development.”
  There was great political concern, not only over what provisions should be in
the bills, but also over whether a vote should be taken.  The Republican leadership
scheduled a vote on H.R. 2621 for the fall of 1998.  Many Democrats were concerned
about voting so close to the elections.14  In the end, H.R. 2621 was defeated by a vote
of 180 to 243.   S. 1269 was not brought to the Senate floor for a vote. 
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
Without “fast-track” authority, the Clinton Administration, in an effort  to
strengthen economic ties with Jordan, negotiated the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement (FTA).  The FTA was adopted into law on  September 28, 2001 (P.L.
107-43).  This was the first U.S. trade agreement ever to include a set of labor
provisions directly in the body of the agreement, where all provisions would be
subject to dispute resolution procedures.   Like the NAFTA  labor side agreement, the
U.S.-Jordan FTA required each country to enforce its own labor standards, and
authorized sanctions for patterns of non-enforcement. However, unlike the NAFTA
side agreement, the U.S.-Jordan FTA did not identify any standards a  unenforceable
by sanctions.
In Congress, the U.S.-Jordan agreement was controversial because of its labor
provisions.  The possibility of using sanctions to require a country to enforce its own
labor standards was a major issue.  Possible action by Congress to reject the
agreement or change the language in the implementing legislation was diverted at the
last minute by an exchange of letters between the United States and Jordan agreeing
to “make very effort o resolve [the disputes] without recourse to the formal dispute
resolution procedures.”15 
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16   Business Round Table.   The Case for U.S. Trade Leadership:  the United States is
Falling Behind, February 9, 2001.
Key TPA Legislation in 2001
Consideration of the U.S.-Jordan FTA occurred on a track parallel to the
continuing debate over presidential trade promotion authority.  The push to resolve
the TPA stalemate was given an extra boost early in 2001, when the Business
Roundtable (BRT) made up of chief executive officers from roughly 200 major
companies, released a report calling anew for fast-track reauthorization, and
suggesting a compromise solution.  The BRT argued that the United States was
falling behind other countries in trade leadership because the United States did not
have fast-track authority.16  
Specifically, in contrast to the traditional ttitude of the business community
against the inclusion of worker ights provisions in trade agreements, he BRT, in its
report, took a stand that:   in pursuing labor (and environmental) objectives in trade
and investment egotiations, the United States hould adopt a “one size does not fit
all” approach.  Rather, “we must grant our trade negotiators the flexibility to
negotiate” instead of placing limitations on the President to include worker rights
provisions in trade agreements.  
Economic Arguments Concerning New TPA
The BRT argued that new trade promotion authority, resulting new trade
agreements, and the trade xpansion that could ensue would be good for the United
States.  Traditional economic arguments primarily support the BRT position, and
point out how further reduction in international trade barriers could benefit
businesses, workers, consumers, and investors alike. 
 For some businesses, an increase in trade from new agreements could help: (1)
expand U.S. exports to new foreign  markets; and (2) expand investment abroad.
Other businesses that compete domestically with imports could suffer difficult
adjustments or go out of business..
For workers, new trade authority could lead to long-term gains if they can shift
to higher paying, higher productivity industries from those being phased out by
increased imports and/or U.S. plant relocations abroad, particularly to developing
countries.  However, what is unclear is the long-term wage impact of increased
international trade, particularly on lower-skilled U.S. workers who, with the exodus
of much low and mid-level manufacturing from the United States, and increased
automation of many remaining jobs,  must essentially move up to higher skill level
jobs or down to lower-skill service jobs.  
For consumers, new trade agreements could: further lower prices on imported
goods,  and help raise overall U.S. productivity levels, which can lead to increases in
the standard of living.    
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17 Sources: [Bush] "Labor and Environment Toolbox," obtained from the U.S. State
Department.  Released by the White House May 10, 2001; "New Democrats Release Fast-
Track Negotiating Principles."  Inside U.S. Trade, May 21, 2001.  "Baucus Releases Fast-
Track Principles."  Inside U.S. Trade, July 25, 2001.  "Statement by AFL-CIO President
John Sweeney on Key Principles for Trade Negotiating Authority," May 11, 2001:
[http://aflcio.org/publ/press2001/pr0511.htm]
For investors, new trade agreements could  give a boost to stocks benefitting
from greater profitability of U.S. businesses.
Other arguments in favor of including worker rights provisions in trade
agreements are that: (1) worker rights provisions can discourage multinational
corporations from engaging in exploitative labor practices in developing countries; (2)
worker rights protections can lessen labor cost differences between countries and
thereby make plant relocation (“runaway plants”) to developing countries less
attractive; and ()3) worker ights protections can help discourage downward pressure
on U.S. wages from cheaper imports.
Other arguments against including worker ights provisions in trade agreements
are that: (1) labor provisions (addressing “social” issues) do not belong in an
economic vehicle designed to promote trade; (2) labor provisions are protectionist (in
that, to the extent that hey impose labor equirements, they may raise the production
costs of the trading partners) and thereby amount to substituting non-tariff barriers
for the tariffs they are designed to reduce or eliminate; and (3) all countries will
eventually adopt worker protections as they develop economically.
The Lead-Up to TPA Compromise Bills
After the BRT issued its position paper, other groups and individuals followed
with their lists of acceptable concepts and provisions for new fast-track authority.
The list of those offering ideas included President Bush, some pro-free-trade
Democrats who called themselves the N wDemocrats, Chairman Phil Crane of the
House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee (with H.R. 2149, the Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001), Senator Max Baucus of the Senate Finance Committee, and
the AFL-CIO.17
Two key bills to reauthorize presidential f st-track authority were introduced in
October, 2001.  Representative Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, and Representative Charles Rangel, ranking minority member of the same
committee, authored bills that, between them, included provisions from virtually all
of the various position papers offered to promote a compromise.  H.R. 3005
(Thomas), the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 (BTPAA) was
reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on October 16, 2001.  H.R. 3019
(Rangel/Levin), the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001, the
Democratic alternative, was voted down as a substitute for the committee bill.  H.R.
3005 was passed by the House on December 6, along party lines, by a vote of 215-
214, and by the Senate Finance Committee by a vote of 18-3 on December 12. 
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H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 Compared
H.R. 3005 was introduced by its author as a bipartisan compromise.  It includes
language and ideas from the reported House bill from 1997 (H.R. 2621),  NAFTA,
the U.S.-Jordan FTA, and the OTCA 1988 fast-track authority.  It also includes a
number of “new” provisions relating to congressional and administrative consultation
and oversight.
H.R. 3019 was offered as a Democratic-sponsored bill and includes two different
approaches, contained in two different sets of principal negotiating objectives,  for the
promotion and enforcement of worker rights.
The sections below compare and contrast  key provisions in H.R. 3005 and H.R.
3019, and address some policy implications of these provisions.  Table 8 at the back
of this report includes a detailed comparison of the labor provisions of H.R. 3005 and
H.R. 3019. 
Overall Negotiating Objectives
Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 include as overall negotiating objectives
(summarizing the conceptual pproach of the bills): to promote worker rights.
However, H.R. 3005 aims to promote respect for worker ights, and H.R. 3019 aims
to promote nforcement of worker ights. (See discussion on the definition of worker
rights, below.)  The overall negotiating objectives of both bills are detailed, below.
Table 2.  H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019: Overall Negotiating 
Objectives
! H.R. 3005, Sec. 2(a)(6): “To promote respect for worker rights and the
rights of children consistent with core labor standards of the ILO . . . and
an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights;”
! H.R. 3019, Sec. 2(a)(11): “To promote enforcement of internationally
recognized core labor standards by trading partners of the United
States.”
Definitions of Worker Rights in H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019
The definitons of worker rights used by each bill cannot be determined by
comparing the terms used in the overall negotiating objectives (in italics) with the
terms and definitions mentioned earlier in this report and repeated below as items
listed under “internationally recognized worker rights” and “core labor
standards.” 
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Thus, one must look elsewhere in each bill to determine which definition of
worker rights each bill uses. It should be re-emphasized, that there is no official
definition of  “worker rights” in international parlance. 
H.R. 3005, in principal negotiating objectives, uses the term “co e labor
standards” in Sec. 2(b)(11)(c), and in Sec.11(2) defines it by listing the items which
are identified below as “internationally recognized worker rights.”  
H.R. 3019 includes two sets of principal negotiating objectives, each of which
contains a different definition of worker rights.  
For principal negotiating objectives for trade agreements in the WTO, H.R. 3019
uses several terms: “core internationally recognized labor standards,”  “core
labor standards,” and “internationally recognized worker rights” which it defines
as indicated below.
For principal negotiating objectives for bilateral trade agreements and trade
agreements in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), H.R. 3019 refers to
“core labor standards” and defines them as indicated below.
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Table 3.  Worker Rights Defined In Terms
of H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019
Worker rights are typically defined in one of two ways: “internationally recognized
worker rights” or “core labor standards.”  
“Internationally recognized worker rights,” typically referenced in U.S. trade laws
and trade agreements, are defined in the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618 as amended by
Sec. 503 of P.L. 98-573) as:
! 1. the right of association;
! 2. the right to organize and bargain collectively;
! 3. prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
! 4. minimum age for the employment of children; and
! 5. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work,
and occupational safety and health.
  “Core labor standards” are defined slightly differently by the International Labor
Organization (ILO).  They substitute for “5” above,
! freedom from employment discrimination.
    Confusing Terms for Worker Rights in H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019:
H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 do not adhere strictly to the above definitions of “worker
rights,” which leads to some confusion. 
! H.R. 3005 refers to its standards as “core labor standards” but defines them
with the list of “internationally recognized worker rights,” above;
! H.R. 3019, on the other hand, calls worker rights by four different names:
      – For multilateral trade agreements negotiated within the World Trade Organization
(WTO), uses three terms to describe worker rights – “core internationally recognized
labor standards,” “internationally recognized worker rights,” and “internationally
recognized core labor standards,” and defines only “internationally recognized worker
rights” with a correct reference to the Trade Act of 1974.  
     – For bilateral agreements and a  Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, it
uses the term “core labor standards” and the definition listed above.
Principal Negotiating Objectives
As mentioned, H.R. 3005 includes one set of principal negotiating objectives
(items targeted for inclusion in trade agreements) applicable to all trade agreements,
and H.R. 3019  includes two distinct sets of principal negotiating objectives: one set
for multilateral trade agreements under the WTO, and the other set for bilateral
agreements and an agreement establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA).
H.R. 3005: For ALL Trade Agreements (WTO, Bilateral, and FTAA).
H.R. 3005 has 12 principal negotiating objectives, of which one relates to labor and
the environment.  It has a number of parts {Sec. 2 (b) (11)}, and  aims to promote
respect for worker ights by focusing on such things as self-enforcement, sovereignty,
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and  dispute resolution procedures  which treat labor issues equally with other issues.
These principal negotiating objectives relating to labor are listed in table 4. 
The key principal negotiating objectives in H.R. 3005 relating to labor (see below)
are similar to provisions that have already appeared in the NAFTA labor side
agreement (which includes the self-enforcement provision), the U.S.-Jordan FTA
(which includes the self-enforcement a d sovereignty provisions, and a commitment
to core labor standards),and H.R. 2621 (Crane, defeated by the House in the 105th
Congress, which includes protections for businesses).  
The principal negotiating objectives relating to dispute settlement procedures in
H. R. 3005 reflect he "flexibility" advocated by the BRT (See “A” under the dispute
settlement procedure description above which calls for penalties appropriate to the
parties, nature, subject matter and scope of the violation.)  The principal negotiating
objectives also reflect calls by organized labor to have labor provisions in trade
agreements treated as equal in importance to “traditional” subjects covered in trade
agreements, e.g., foreign investment, intellectual property, etc. (See “B” under the
dispute settlement procedure description above.)  
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Table 4.  H.R. 3005:  Principal Negotiating Objectives for All
Trade Agreements (WTO, Bilateral and FTAA)
! Self-enforcement, Sec.2(b)(11)(A): “To ensure that a party. . . does not fail to
effectively enforce its . . . labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade. . .” (similar to the NAFTA labor
side agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA);
 
! Sovereignty, Sec b(11)(B): “To recognize that parties to a trade agreement 
retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial,
regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the
allocation of resources to enforcement. . . and to recognize that a country is
effective in enforcing its laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a
reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision
regarding the allocation of resources” (similar to the NAFTA labor side
agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA);
! Core Labor Standards, Sec.2(b)(11)(C): “To strengthen the capacity of U.S.
trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards;”
! Protections for businesses, Sec.2(b)(11)(G): “To ensure that labor. .  policies
and practices of the parties to the trade agreement with the United States do not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as
disguised barriers to trade” (similar to H.R. 2621 in the 105th Congress);
! Dispute Settlement, Sec. 2(b)(12):  By way of enforcement, H.R. 3005 would:
A.   Sec.2 (b)(12)(E): “Seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to a
dispute under that agreement that encourages compliance with the obligations
of the agreement,  is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter and scope
of the violation,  and has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests
not party to the dispute while maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement
mechanism;” and
B. Sec. 2(b)(12)(F): “Seek provisions that treat U.S. principal negotiating
objectives equally” with other negotiating objectives  [i.e., treat labor issues
equally with foreign investment, intellectual property, etc.] “with respect to the
ability to resort to dispute settlement under the applicable agreement, the
availability of equivalent dispute settlement procedures,  and the availability of
equivalent remedies.”
H.R. 3019: For Trade Agreements Negotiated in the WTO.   H.R. 3019
has 23 principal negotiating objectives, of which one relates to labor and the
environment.  It has several parts {Sec.2(b)(13)}, and aims to promote and enforce
“core internationally recognized labor standards,” primarily through WTO and ILO
promotion and enforcement.  I s principal negotiating objectives for trade agreements
in the  WTO are detailed in table 5 below. 
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Table 5.  H.R. 3019:  Principal Negotiating Objectives for Trade 
Agreements Negotiated in the WTO
! Achieve a framework, Sec. 2(b)(13)(A): “To achieve a framework of
enforceable multilateral rules as s soon as practicable that leads to the
adoption and enforcement of core labor standards, including  in the
WTO, and as appropriate other international organizations including the
ILO;”
! Update WTO Agreements, Sec. 2(b)(13)(B): “To update article XX of
the GATT, 1994, and Article XIV of the GATS in relation to core
internationally recognized worker rights, including in regard to actions of
WTO members, taken consistent with and in furtherance of
recommendations made by the ILO under Article 33 of the Constitution
of the ILO;”
! Establish a working group, Sec 2(b)(13)(C): “To establish promptly a
working group on trade and labor issues” (without specifying the forum)
–“to explore the linkage between international trade and investment and
internationally recognized worker rights (as defined in section 502(a)(4)
of the Trade Act of 1974) taking into account differences in the level of
development among countries;”
! Provide for regular review, Sec. 2(b)(13)(D): “To provide for regular
review of adherence to core labor standards in the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism established in Annex 3 to the WTO agreement;”
! Establish a regular working relationship, Sec. 2(b)(13)(E): “To establish a
working relationship between the WTO and the ILO. . to provide WTO
members with technical and legal assistance in developing and enforcing
internationally recognized core labor standards;”
! Improve WTO-ILO coordination, Sec. 2(b)(15)(C): “To improve
coordination between the WTO and other international organizations
such as ... the ILO;”
! Achieve Dispute Settlement, Sec. (2)(b)(6): “To improve enforcement of
decisions of dispute settlement panels to ensure prompt compliance by
foreign governments with their obligations under the WTO.”
Provisions in H.R. 3019 call for the establishment of a framework that leads to the
adoption and enforcement of core labor standards in the WTO and in the ILO, and
specify some of the elements in that framework.  These provisions are subject to two
different interpretations.  One interpretation is that they have the potential to be very
strong – even stronger than the provisions in H.R. 3005 which are open-ended and
permit great negotiating flexibility.  The reason for the strength of H.R. 3019
provisions, proponents of this position argue, is that the WTO has in place specific
dispute settlement procedures. Proponents of this idea also argue that the ILO is
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18  The ILO   adopted a declaration in June of 1998 which said, in part, that all member
countries, even if they have not ratified ILO conventions (e.g., core labor standards) have an
obligation arising from the fact of their membership in the ILO, to respect, and promote core
labor standards.  International Labour Conference 96th Session, Geneva, June 1998.  Obtained
from the ILO website: [http://www.ilo.org].
19  Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, states that “in the event of any Member failing to carry
out within the time specified the recommendations if any, contained in the report of the
Commission of Inquiry. . . the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action
as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance herewith.” The resolution approved
by the delegates recommended that ILO members review their relations with Myanmar to
ensure that they do not abet the system of forced or compulsory labor. Source: In Historic
Vote, ILO Assembly Tightens Pressure on Myanmar.  ILO News, August 8, 2000:
[http://us.ilo.org/news/focus/0008/FOCUS-1.html].
already set to be a partner with the WTO in promoting and enforcing worker rights
because the ILO is the international organization  with the major responsibility for
promoting and enforcing worker rights around the world.  
The other interpretation suggests hat he framework described on page 13 for the
adoption and enforcement of core labor standards in the WTO and the ILO could
represent a long-term approach.  Proponents argue this position based on efforts
stemming from the Uruguay Round Agreements implementing Act (Sec. 131 of P.L.
103-465), which  required that the President seek a working party in the WTO to
examine the relationship between i ternationally recognized worker ights and trade.
As mentioned earlier in this report, President Clinton did seek such a working party
in the WTO; but he was unsuccessful because his efforts met with great resistance by
developing countries, which make up a majority in the WTO.  
Proponents of the idea that promotion and enforcement of worker ights through
the WTO and the ILO could be a long-term approach also argue that the ILO, an
organization with roughly 175 members, has a limited range of enforcement tools.18
 The ILO’s primary tools for promoting and enforcing worker ights throughout the
world are technical assistance, consultation, recordkeeping  (i.e., maintaining lists
showing which countries have formally adopted which labor standards), and
persuasion.  The ILO is dependent on self-enforcement by member countries, with
little chance of penalty for non-compliance.  The ILO’s strongest enforcement tool,
Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, relies on voluntary trade discrimination against
countries that do not meet ILO guidelines.  Article 33 has been used only  once – on
Myanmar, in 2000, in an effort o try to put group pressure on that country to end its
widespread use of forced labor.19  
H.R. 3019: For a FreeTrade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and
Bilateral Agreements.  H.R. 3019's principal negotiating objectives for an FTAA
agreement differ considerably from its objectives for WTO trade agreements.  Instead
of delegating promotion and enforcement of worker ights to the WTO and the ILO,
H.R. 3019  seeks to incorporate strict enforcement guidelines into the FTAA itself.
Principal negotiating objectives for an FTAA and bilateral agreements are identified
below.
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The H.R. 3019 provisions, if adopted in an FTAA, could take worker rights
promotion and enforcement to a new level of worker rights promotion beyond the
NAFTA labor side agreement and beyond the U.S.-Jordan FTA by: (1) including in
an FTAA enforceable rules for the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards
(although each country would have the right to establish its own domestic labor
standards consistent with core labor standards); (2) providing for phased-in
compliance with labor market standards for least-developed countries; and (3)
including dispute settlement provisions which would provide in all contexts for the
use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt and full
compliance with decisions by the dispute settlement panel. (By comparison, NAFTA
limits remedies to fines and, for non-payment of fines,  removal of NAFTA benefits
to the amount of the penalty for one year.)
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Table 6.  H.R. 3019:  Principal Negotiating Objectives for FTAA
and Bilateral Agreements
! Retain the right to allocate resources on the basis of priorities, Sec.
2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(I): For  FTAA members “to retain the right to exercise
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of
resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters determined
to have higher priorities;” 
! Retain the right to establish own domestic labor standards, Sec.
2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(I): For  FTAA members to “retain the right to establish
their own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly
labor policies, laws, and regulations, in a manner consistent with” core
labor standards.”
! Provide for phased-in compliance, Sec. 2(c)(9)(C): “To provide for
phased-in compliance for least-developed countries comparable to
mechanisms utilized in other FTAA agreements;”
! Regularly review countries’ adherence, Sec. 2(c)(9)(E): To “ provide
regular review of adherence to core labor standards;”
! Exceptions from FTAA obligations, Sec. 2(c)(9)(F): “To create
exceptions from the obligations under the FTAA agreements for products
produced by prison labor or slave labor, products produced by child
labor, and actions taken consistent with and in furtherance of
recommendations made by the ILO;“
! Improve FTAA-ILO coordination, Sec. 2(c)(11)(A): “To improve
coordination between the FTAA and other international organizations
such as . .  . the ILO. . . to increase the effectiveness of technical
assistance programs;” and
! Achieve dispute settlement procedures, Sec. 2(c)(4)(B): “To provide in
all contexts for the use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to
promote prompt and full compliance with decisions by the dispute
settlement panel.”
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Congressional and Administrative Oversight
Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 include provisions for congressional and
administrative oversight of trade agreements.  Both bills would include reviews of the
potential impact of  new trade agreements on U.S. workers.  The two bills differ in
who would produce as well as receive the reports.  
Under H.R. 3005, reports would be transmitted from the President to the House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. Under H.R. 3019, (see table 7
below), they would be transmitted from the U.S. Trade Representative n conjunction
with the International Trade Commission and the Department of Labor to Congress.
 The bills also differ in their timing requirements.  
H.R. 3005 has no specific timing requirements.  H.R. 3019 has very specific
requirements which include different schedules for different potential trade
agreements.  For agreements negotiated under the WTO, an initial review is due to
Congress within six months after the onset of the negotiations, and a final version is
due not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is signed by the President.
See page 21 for congressional and administrative oversight provisions.
 The extensive use of consultations and reports to Congress and committees on
various labor rights issues connected with trade, would cover new ground.  Some
observers argue that, of the two bills, H.R. 3005's provisions are stronger because
they require more reports.  Others contend that H.R. 3019's provisions are stronger
because they are much more detailed and include strict time requirements for
preliminary and final versions of the report.    
The table that follows lays out a more detailed comparison between the various
approaches to trade promotion authority discussed in this report.  
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Table 7.  H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019: Congressional and
Administrative Oversight
       Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 provide for reviews on the employment
effects of trade agreements:
! H.R. 3005, Review on employment, Sec. 2(c)(5) directs the President to “review
the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment, modeled after
Executive Order 13141, and report to the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committee on such review.”
! H.R. 3019, Review on employment, Sec.6(e): “Upon the commencement of
negotiations for a trade agreement, the Trade Representative, jointly with the
Secretary of Labor and the Commissioners of the International Trade
Commission, and in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, shall
commence a review of the effects on workers in the United States of a proposed
trade agreement.”  The Trade Representative shall submit to Congress within 6
months after the onset of negotiations, a preliminary draft of the labor review. . . 
and not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is signed by the
President, the final version of the labor review.”
H.R. 3005 also includes additional provisions for reports and administrative
oversight.  It provides that the President shall:
! Consultative mechanisms: Sec. 2(c)(2): “seek to establish consultative
mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of
U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards [defined as
internationally recognized worker rights] and to report to” the house Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee on the context and
operation of such mechanisms.”
! Consultations by the Secretary of Labor, Sec. 2(c)(7): “have the Secretary of
Labor consult with any country seeking a trade agreement with the United States
concerning that country’s labor laws and provide technical assistance to that
country if needed;
! Survey on prohibitions against exploitative child labor, Sec. 2(c)(8):  “submit to
the Congress a report describing the extent to which the country or countries that
are parties to the agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child
labor;” and
! Report on effectiveness of penalties in promoting worker rights, Sec. 2(c)(11): 
report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees “not later
than 12 months after the imposition of a penalty or remedy by the United States
permitted by a trade agreement. . .on the effectiveness of the penalty or remedy  
. . . . The report shall address whether the penalty or remedy was effective in
changing the behavior of the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy
had any adverse impact on parties or interest not party to the dispute.” 
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Table 8.  Comparison of H.R. 3005 (Thomas) and H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin)
Category H.R. 3005 (Thomas)
For all agreements
H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) 
(WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements )
Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives
Sec. 2(a)(6):  To promote respect for
worker rights consistent with the
ILO, and an understanding of the
relationship between trade and
worker rights.
Sec. 2(a)(11): To promote enforcement of
internationally recognized core labor
standards by U.S. trading partners.
Principal Negotiating Objectives WTO agreements
To promote worker rights Sec. 2(b)(11)(C):
To strengthen the capacity of U.S.
trading partners to promote respect
for core labor standards
Sec. 2(b)(13)(A):
To achieve a framework that leads to
adoption and enforcement of “core
internationally recognized labor standards”
through such organizations as the WTO and
the ILO. 
To create WTO review
of standards
No provision. Sec. 2(b)(13)(D):
To Regularly review adherence to core labor
standards in the WTO
To establish/improve
 WTO-ILO Cooperation
No similar provision as a principal
negotiating objective.  However, as a
directive:
Sec. 2(c)(1): For the President to
seek greater cooperation between the
WTO and the ILO
Sec. 2(b)(13)(E):
To establish a WTO-ILO working
relationship
Sec. 2(b)(15)(C):
To improve WTO-ILO coordination
To ensure self- enforcementSec. 2(b)(11)(A):
To ensure that a party does not fail
to enforce its own labor laws through
a sustained course of action or
inaction in a manner affecting trade
No similar provision.
To maintain sovereignty Sec. 2(b)(11)(B):
To recognize the right of parties to
exercise discretion regarding
allocation of resources on
enforcement.
No similar provision in the WTO provisions,
but a similar provision is included under the
FTAA provisions, below.
To protect U.S. interests Sec. 2(b)(11)(G):
To ensure that labor policies and
practices do not unjustifiably
discriminate against U.S. exports or
serve as disguised barriers to trade.
No similar provision.
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Category H.R. 3005 (Thomas)
For all agreements
H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) 
(WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements )
Update worker rights for the
GATT and GATS
No provision. Sec. 2(b)(13)(B):  
To update Article XX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
1994 and Article XIV of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to
reflect ILO core internationally recognized
worker rights and recommendations under
article 33.  In this way, a country could
legally deviate from its obligations under the
WTO and discriminate against imports
produced under conditions not protected by
core labor standards or not meeting ILO
recommendations.
To establish a working
 group on trade and labor
No provision. Sec. 2(b)(13)(C):
To establish working group on trade and
labor issues (without specifying the forum.)
Dispute Settlement Sec. 2(b)(12)(E):
To seek penalties appropriate to the
parties, subject matter and scope of
the violation that will be effective,
but not adversely affect parties not
involved in the dispute.
Sec. 2(b)(12)(F):
To seek provisions that treat U.S.
principal negotiating objectives
equally with other negotiating
objectives (i.e. treat labor issues
equally with foreign investment,
intellectual property, etc.)
Sec. 2(b)(6)(A):
To nsure prompt compliance by foreign
governments with their obligations under the
WTO.
No similar provision.
 FTAA/Bilateral Agreements ONLY
To negotiate enforceable
           rules
No specific provisions for
FTAA/Bilateral Agreements.  
Provisions applicable to all
agreements (detailed above) apply.  
Sec. 2(b)(11)(C):
Mentioned above:  To strengthen the
capacity of U.S. trading partners to
promote respect for core labor
standards
Sec. 2(c)(9)(A): 
To include enforceable rules providing for the
adoption and enforcement of ILO core labor
standards.
Sec. 2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(II): 
 For FTAA members to retain the right to
establish their own domestic labor standards
consistent with core labor standards.
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Category H.R. 3005 (Thomas)
For all agreements
H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) 
(WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements )
Principal Negotiating Objectives (Cont.) FTAA/Bilateral  ONLY (Cont.)
To establish dispute  settlement
trigger
No provision. Sec. 2(c)(9)(B): 
To establish a trigger for invoking the dispute
settlement process.  The trigger shall be: (a)
an FTAA member’s sustained failure to
enforce; or (b) waiver or derogation from
domestic labor standards to attract
investment or gain a competitive advantage.
To maintain sovereignty Sec. 2(b)(11)(B) –  (mentioned under
H.R. 3005 general provisions,
earlier): To recognize the right of
parties to exercise discretion
regarding the allocation of resources
on enforcement.
Sec. 2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(I):
Similar provision to that in H.R. 3005. 
To provide phased-in 
compliance
No provision. Sec. 2(c)(9)(C):
To provide phased-in compliance with labor
market standards for least-developed
countries.
To create an  FTAA  work
program
No provision. Sec. 2(c)(9)(D):
To create FTAA work program providing
guidance, technical assistance, and market
access incentives for FTAA members to
adhere to and enforce core labor standards
To review countries’  adherence
to standards
No provision. Sec. 2(c)(9)(E):
To regularly review countries’ adherence to
core labor standards
To create exceptions from
FTAA obligations
No provision. Sec. 2(c)(9)(F):
To create exceptions from FTAA trade
obligations for products produced by prison,
slave, or child labor and for ILO
recommendations.
To improve FTAA-ILO 
coordination
No provision, but as mentioned
previously:
Sec. 2(c)(1): For the President to
seek greater cooperation between the
WTO and the ILO.
Sec. 2(c)(11)(A):
To improve FTAA-ILO coordination to
increase effectiveness of technical assistance
programs.
Dispute Settlement See dispute settlement provision
under WTO Agreement.
Sec. 2(c)(4)(B):
To provide in all contexts for the use of all
remedies that are demonstrably effective to
promote prompt and full compliance with
decisions by the dispute settlement panel.
CRS-25
Category H.R. 3005 (Thomas)
For all agreements
H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) 
(WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements )
Congressional and Administrative (Labor) Oversight 
Review Effects on Workers Sec. 2(c)(5):
The President shall review the impact
of future trade agreements on U.S.
employment and report to House
Ways and Means (HW&M) and
Senate Finance (SF) Committees.
Sec. 6(e):
The USTR, Secretary of Labor, and
International Trade Commission shall begin
review of the effects on U.S. workers of the
proposed trade agreement, and the USTR
shall submit a draft report to Congress 6
months after onset of negotiations, and a final
version at least 90 calendar days before the
agreement is signed by the President. 
(Several exceptions on timing include one for
FTAA: preliminary draft due 18 months after
enactment.)
Report to Congressional
Committees
Sec. 2(c)(2):
The President shall seek consultative
mechanisms among Parties to
promote respect for core labor
standards and report to HW&M and
SF Committees.
No similar provision.
Technical Assistance by 
Secretary of Labor
Sec. 2(c)(7):
The President shall have the
Secretary of Labor consult with any
country seeking a U.S. trade
agreement about its labor laws and
provide technical assistance if
needed.
No similar provision.
Report to Congress Sec. 2(c)(8):
The President shall submit to
Congress a report describing the
extent to which parties to a trade
agreement have laws governing
exploitative child labor.
No similar provision.
Report to Congressional
Committees
Sec. 2(c)(11):
The President shall report to HW&M
and SF Committees within 12
months after a penalty is imposed, on
its effectiveness in enforcing U.S.
rights under the trade agreement,
whether the penalty was effective in
changing the behavior of the targeted
party, and whether it had adverse
impacts on parties not involved in 
the dispute.
No similar provision.
 
